Reassessing the Constitutional Role of the Governor

After Reading This Article You Can Solve This UPSC Mains Model Questions:

Examine the constitutional mandate of the Governor’s address under Article 176 and analyse its implications for federalism and democratic accountability in India. 250 Words (GS-2, Polity)

Context

• Recent instances of Governor in states like Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Kerala departing from the text of the customary address or staging walkouts have sparked a national debate on the relevance of Article 176 of the Indian constitution.
• These friction points highlight an escalating tension between the Constitutional Head and the Elected Executive of states, raising questions about whether this ceremonial practice has transitioned from a symbol of continuity into a tool for partisan obstruction.

Constitutional Provisions Governing the Office of the Governor

The Constitution of India establishes the Governor as a vital link in the federal structure, functioning as both the formal head of the state and a representative of the Union.

• Article 163 (Aid and Advice): Mandates that the Governor must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Since the address is an executive policy document, the Governor possesses no independent discretion to edit, skip, or modify the text prepared by the Cabinet.

• Article 168 (Constitutional Integration): Recognizes the Governor as an integral part of the State Legislature. This implies that the legislature is incomplete without the Governor, making their participation in the opening session a structural necessity rather than a mere choice.
• Article 175 (Right to Address and Send Messages): This gives the Governor the power to address the House or send messages regarding pending Bills. It is a tool for communication between the Head of State and the lawmakers, intended to ensure legislative focus on urgent matters.
• Article 176 (The Mandatory Address): Obligates the Governor to address the first session after a general election and the first session of each year. This address is essentially the Government’s Political Manifesto, outlining the legislative agenda and policy goals.

Judicial Interpretations: Scope and Limits of Gubernatorial Powers

The Judiciary has consistently intervened to define the boundaries of the “pleasure of the President” and the scope of discretionary authority, ensuring the office does not overstep its mandate.

• Nabam Rebia Case (2016): The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the Governor is not a parallel power center. The power to summon, prorogue, or address the House is not discretionary and must be exercised solely on the aid and advice of the Cabinet.
• Shivraj Singh Chouhan Case (2020): The SC reaffirmed that the Floor Test is the sole constitutional mechanism to test the majority of a government. It limited the Governor’s subjective interference in determining the stability of a ruling party.
• State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2023): The Court emphasized that Governors cannot indefinitely withhold assent to Bills. It established that if a Bill is re-passed by the House, the Governor must grant assent, reinforcing the supremacy of the elected legislature.
• 2025 Presidential Reference (Article 143): While the SC held that rigid timelines cannot be imposed via “deemed assent,” it clarified that unexplained delays are subject to limited judicial review, as they undermine the democratic process.

Is the Governor’s Address a Colonial Relic?

1. Arguments for Retaining the Address: The Governor’s address symbolically reinforces the constitutional position of the Governor as an integral part of the legislature and reflects the continuity of India’s parliamentary system.
2. It provides a structured and formal platform for the elected government to present its legislative agenda and policy priorities before the House and the public.
3. Arguments for Reconsideration: The legislature functions effectively without the Governor’s address in other sessions, indicating that governance is not structurally dependent on this ceremony.
4. Given its increasing politicisation, the practice is viewed by critics as having outlived its utility, contributing more to constitutional friction than to democratic accountability.

Key Controversies Surrounding the Office of the Governor

The office of the Governor has increasingly emerged as a flashpoint of Centre–State friction, owing to several systemic and institutional issues that affect federal balance and constitutional governance.

• The Address as a Political Battleground: When a Governor omits portions of the speech (e.g., criticisms of the Centre or specific state schemes), it creates a Constitutional Vacuum. Without a complete address, the subsequent Motion of Thanks becomes technically flawed, potentially disrupting or stalling legislative business.
• Conflict in the Chancellor Role: Tensions arise when Governors, acting as Ex-officio Chancellors, bypass state recommendations for Vice-Chancellor (VC) appointments. In 2025, the SC’s intervention through the Justice Dhulia Committee highlighted that the Governor’s role in universities must align with institutional autonomy rather than personal or central preference.
• Withholding or Delaying Assent to State Bills: By sitting on Bills or reserving them for the President’s Consideration without valid constitutional grounds, Governors can effectively veto state laws, leading to a paralysis of governance in Opposition-ruled states.
• The “Agent of the Centre” Perception: Since Governors hold office at the “pleasure of the President,” they are often perceived as politically beholden to the Union. This Institutional Dependence discourages them from acting as impartial constitutional arbiters.
• Legislative and Executive Interference: Constitutional tensions intensify when Governors delay the summoning or proroguing of the Legislative Assembly contrary to the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
  • During periods of political instability, Governors have occasionally ordered floor tests based on opposition claims, bypassing the Speaker and established conventions.
  • Disputes also arise in post-election government formation, where the exercise of gubernatorial discretion is perceived as partisan, thereby eroding democratic legitimacy.

Impact on Federalism and Constitutional Governance

The friction surrounding the Governor’s office strikes at the core of India’s Federal Equilibrium, shifting the relationship from a cooperative partnership to a site of institutional deadlock.

• Erosion of Cooperative Federalism: The transition toward Coercive Federalism occurs when the Governor’s office is used to censor or obstruct a State’s policy priorities. Recurrent instances of acting contrary to aid and advice foster deep-seated distrust, replacing collaboration with partisan confrontation.
• Violation of Cabinet Responsibility: Refusing to read the Cabinet-approved address directly challenges Collective Responsibility under Article 163. Bypassing this text undermines the Democratic Mandate and establishes an unelected, parallel power center.
• Administrative Paralysis and Policy Stalling: The arbitrary use of the “Pocket Veto”—enabled by the lack of strict timelines in Article 200—allows Governors to sit on Bills indefinitely. This leads to a breakdown of Constitutional Comity, stalling welfare schemes, and governance delivery.
• Centralization through Indirect Control: When the Governor is perceived as an instrument of the Union executive, it facilitates indirect centralization. This disturbs the federal balance particularly in Opposition-ruled regions, and dilutes the institutional trust required for a functional “Union of States.”
• Judicialization of Federal Disputes: Persistent confrontations compel States to seek frequent judicial intervention, resulting in the judicialization of Centre–State relations. This places an avoidable strain on the Judiciary and indicates a failure of established Constitutional Morality.

Committee Recommendations for Reform

Various panels have suggested reforms to restore the Dignity of the Office and ensure Cooperative Federalism.

Commission	Key Recommendations
Sarkaria Commission (1988)	Proposed that Governors should be eminent persons from outside the state and not active in politics. Article 356 should be a “last resort.”
Venkatachaliah Commission (2002)	Suggested a fixed five-year term; removal should only occur after formal consultation with the Chief Minister.
Punchhi Commission (2010)	Recommended deleting the “pleasure doctrine” and providing for impeachment by the State Legislature. It also advised limiting the Governor’s role as University Chancellor to prevent administrative friction.

Way Forward: Restoring Constitutional Balance in the Governor’s Office

To ensure that the Governor’s address and other functions remain constructive, structural reforms are essential:

• Codification of Gubernatorial Discretion: The Union government should clearly define the limited circumstances in which a Governor may act independently, eliminating arbitrary interpretations of Article 163 and ensuring predictability in constitutional conduct.
• Institutionalising the Appointment Process: Adopting a collegium-based appointment mechanism involving the Prime Minister, Chief Justice of India, Speaker of the Lok Sabha, and the concerned Chief Minister would promote bipartisanship and political neutrality.
• Time-bound Action on Constitutional Duties: Prescribing reasonable timelines for assent to Bills and performance of mandatory functions under Articles 176 and 200 would prevent administrative paralysis and misuse of the “pocket veto.”
• Upholding Constitutional Civility: Governors should communicate reservations through private and formal constitutional channels, avoiding public divergence from Cabinet-approved texts, thereby preserving collective responsibility and constitutional discipline.
• Reaffirming the Primacy of the Floor Test: Consistent with Shivraj Singh Chouhan (2020), the Floor Test must remain the sole constitutional mechanism to assess legislative majority, restricting subjective or politically motivated interventions.
• Separation from Partisan Roles: Limiting the Governor’s role in non-core executive functions (such as University Chancellorships) would reduce institutional friction and reinforce the Governor’s position as a neutral constitutional arbiter.

Conclusion

The role of the Governor must evolve from a perceived instrument of central oversight into a neutral constitutional sentinel to prevent the erosion of cooperative federalism and democratic accountability. Restoring this balance requires the urgent codification of discretionary powers and the adoption of collegium-based appointments, ensuring the office facilitates rather than obstructs the mandate of the elected state executive.