Naxalism in India

After Reading This Article You Can Solve This UPSC Mains PYQ 2022:

Naxalism is a social, economic and developmental issue manifesting as a violent internal security threat. In this context, discuss the emerging issues gest a multilayered strategy to tackle the menace of Naxalism. 15 Marks (GS-3 Internal Security).

Context

 The Union Home Minister has set a target of March 31, 2026, to completely eliminate Naxalism from India. According to MHA (2025), “Most Affected Districts” have declined from 36 in 2014 to just 3 in 2025 (Bijapur, Sukma, and Narayanpur in Chhattisgarh). Total affected districts dropped from 126 to 11.

What is Naxalism?

Naxalism, or Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), is an armed insurgency inspired by Maoist ideology (specifically the “Protracted People’s War”).

• Objective: To overthrow the Indian State through armed rebellion and establish a “People’s Government.”
• Methodology: Guerrilla warfare, creation of “liberated zones,” and mobilization of marginalized sections (tribals and landless laborers) against “class enemies” (landlords and the State).

Background of Naxalism in India

• Naxalbari Uprising (1967): It began in Naxalbari village, West Bengal, led by Charu Majumdar, Kanu Sanyal, and Jangal Santhal. It was a peasant revolt against exploitative landlords (Jotedars).
• Ideological Split: The movement led to a split in the CPI(M), forming the CPI (Marxist-Leninist) in 1969.
• Formation of CPI (Maoist): In 2004, the merger of the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) created the “CPI (Maoist),” which is currently the dominant insurgent group.

Phases of Naxalism in India

Phase I: The Naxalbari Period (1967 – 1975)

• Focus: Romanticized “Peasant Revolution.”
• Characteristics: Started in Naxalbari (West Bengal). It was primarily an ideological movement against feudalism and land-lords (Jotedars).
• Outcome: Highly fragmented. It was largely suppressed by 1972 following Operation Steeplechase and the death of Charu Majumdar.

Phase II: Fragmentation & Survival (1975 – 2004)

• Focus: Regional Consolidation.
• Characteristics: The movement split into many factions. Two dominant groups emerged:
  • People’s War Group (PWG) in Andhra Pradesh (Telangana region).
  • Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in Bihar and Jharkhand.
• Outcome: Shifted its base from plains to deep forested terrains, focusing on tribal (Adivasi) mobilization against the State.

Phase III: Peak & The “Red Corridor” (2004 – 2014)

• Focus: Militarization and Expansion.
• Characteristics: In 2004, the PWG and MCC merged to form the CPI (Maoist). This unified the movement under a single command.
• The “Red Corridor”: Influenced a vast stretch from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh, affecting over 180 districts.
• Outcome: Escalation of violence, including the 2010 Dantewada ambush. The government declared it the “single biggest internal security challenge.”

Phase IV: Decline & Consolidation (2014 – Present)

• Focus: Shrinking Footprint & Elimination.
• Characteristics: Implementation of the SAMADHAN strategy. A heavy focus on “Security-cum-Development.”
• Current Status: As of March 2026, the movement is restricted to just a few pockets in South Chhattisgarh. The government is currently in the final stages of the mission to achieve a “Naxal-Free India” by the end of this year.

Causes of Naxalism in India

1. Land Alienation: Failure of “Land to the Tiller” reforms led to land concentration among elites, leaving tribals as exploited, landless laborers.
2. The Mining-Development Paradox: Massive displacement of Adivasis for mineral extraction without equitable compensation or rehabilitation fueled “anti-state” resentment.
3. Forest Rights Violation: Slow implementation of the Forest Rights Act (2006) and criminalization of traditional livelihoods (Minor Forest Produce) alienated forest-dwellers.
4. Governance Deficit: A “vacuum” of state services (schools, healthcare) allowed Maoists to establish parallel systems like Jan Adalats (People’s Courts).
5. Socio-Economic Neglect: Acute poverty, malnutrition, and unemployment in the “Red Corridor” created a fertile recruiting ground for armed insurgency.
6. Exploitation by Middlemen: The predatory Thekedar (contractor) and moneylender system, including (bonded labor), forced many to seek “instant justice” from Naxals.
7. Infrastructural Isolation: Lack of roads and connectivity in regions like Bastar provided Naxals a strategic haven while keeping the State at a distance.

Government Initiatives to Combat Naxalism in India

The government follows a Multi-Pronged Strategy:

1. Security Measures

• SAMADHAN Doctrine (2017):
• S– Smart Leadership
• A– Aggressive Strategy
• M– Motivation and Training
• A– Actionable Intelligence
• D– Dashboard-based KPIs
• H– Harnessing Technology (Drones, GIS)
• A– Action Plan for each Theatre
• N– No Access to Financing (Financial Choking via NIA/ED)
• Specialized Forces: Deployment of CoBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) of the CRPF, along with state-specific units like Greyhounds (AP/Telangana) and the District Reserve Guard (DRG) in Chhattisgarh.
• Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme: Provides 100% central reimbursement for operational expenses, insurance for SFs, and community policing.
• Fortified Police Stations: Over 656 Fortified Police Stations have been constructed in LWE areas (as of Feb 2026) to withstand heavy insurgent attacks.
• Choking Naxal Finance: Dedicated verticals in the NIA (National Investigation Agency) and ED (Enforcement Directorate) to seize assets and disrupt the extortion networks.

2. Development-Led Initiatives

• Special Central Assistance (SCA): Funds provided to the “Most Affected Districts” to fill critical gaps in public infrastructure (e.g., small bridges, primary health centers).
• Infrastructure Connectivity:
  • Roads: Under the Road Requirement Plan (RRP) and RCPLWE, over 15,000 km of roads have been completed.
  • Telecom: The LWE Mobile Tower Project has commissioned over 9,200 towers (4G saturation) to eliminate “shadow zones.”
• Education & Skill Development:
  • Eklavya Model Residential Schools (EMRS): 179 functional schools provide quality education to tribal students.
  • ITI/SDC: Setting up Industrial Training Institutes and Skill Development Centres in each affected district.
• Financial Inclusion: Opening of nearly 6,000 Post Offices and 1,800+ Bank branches/ATMs in formerly unbanked LWE zones.

3. Rights and Entitlements

• Forest Rights Act (2006): Prioritizing the settlement of individual and community forest rights to reduce tribal alienation.
• Niyad Nellanar Scheme (Chhattisgarh): A 2024-25 flagship initiative meaning “Your Good Village,” aimed at providing 25+ essential government services to villages in the core Bastar region.

4. Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy

• Financial Incentives: Central government provides an immediate grant of ₹5 Lakh for higher-ranked cadres and ₹2.5 Lakh for others who surrender.
• Mainstreaming: Includes vocational training, monthly stipends for 3 years, and land/housing support to prevent re-entry into insurgency.

5. Public Perception Management

• Civic Action Programme (CAP): CAPFs conduct medical camps, distribute essential items, and organize sports (e.g., the Bastar Olympics 2025-26) to build trust with local populations.
• Tribal Youth Exchange Programme: Organized by NYKS to expose tribal youth to the developmental progress in other parts of India.

Challenges in Combating Naxalism

1. Geographical & Tactical Challenges

• Difficult Terrain: The core “liberated zones” (like Abujhmad in Chhattisgarh) consist of 4,000 sq. km of unsurveyed, dense hilly forests, making aerial surveillance and troop movement difficult.
• Asymmetric Warfare: Naxals use “hit-and-run” guerrilla tactics and IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), which negate the numerical superiority of security forces.
• Safe Havens at Inter-State Junctions: Insurgents exploit the “tri-junctions” of state borders (e.g., Chhattisgarh-Odisha-Telangana) to escape from one state’s jurisdiction into another.

2. Intelligence & Operational Gaps

• Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Deficit: Local villagers often refuse to provide information due to fear of brutal retaliation by Naxal Jan Adalats (People’s Courts).
• Technology vs. Canopy: Dense forest cover often renders high-end drones and satellite imagery less effective for real-time tracking of small guerrilla squads.
• IED Proliferation: The high cost of human life due to pressure-cooker bombs and sophisticated landmines remains the biggest hurdle for ground patrols.

3. Governance & Developmental Hurdles

• The “Trust Deficit”: Decades of neglect and perceived state high-handedness make it difficult for administrative machinery to win “hearts and minds.”
• Delayed Infrastructure: Road construction in Maoist strongholds is slow because contractors are targeted, and equipment is frequently burnt by insurgents.
• Ineffective Local Bodies: In many affected areas, the PESA Act and 5th Schedule are not implemented in spirit, leaving a power vacuum that Naxals fill.

4. Ideological & Structural Challenges

• Urban Naxalism/Overground Network: The existence of support structures in cities—providing legal aid, recruitment, and propaganda—makes it a “invisible” multi-front war.
• Extortion Economy: Naxals run a multi-crore “taxation” racket, taxing mining companies, PWD contractors, and tendu leaf collectors, ensuring they remain well-funded despite demonetization or financial choking.
• Radicalization of Youth: Exploiting local grievances (like unemployment and displacement) to recruit the next generation of “People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army” (PLGA) cadres.

5. Legal & Human Rights Constraints

• Collateral Damage: Any civilian casualty during an operation is used by Naxal propaganda to further alienate the masses from the State.
• Legal Delays: The slow judicial process in convicting high-ranking Maoist leaders often allows them to continue directing operations from behind bars or while on bail

Way Forward

1. Transition to “Governance-Led” Consolidation

• From ‘Clear-Hold’ to ‘Develop’: Shift focus from kinetic military operations to the “Develop” phase. Ensure that the administrative vacuum created by the retreat of Maoists is immediately filled by civilian officials and not just security camps.
• Universal Service Delivery: Scale up the Niyad Nellanar (Your Good Village) model across all former “Most Affected Districts” to ensure 100% saturation of health, education, and electricity.

2. Institutionalizing Tribal Rights

• PESA & Forest Rights: Ensure the PESA Act (1996) and Forest Rights Act (2006) are implemented in letter and spirit to empower Gram Sabhas. This addresses the root cause of “alienation” by giving tribals control over minor forest produce and local land decisions.
• Land Record Digitization: Accelerate the digitizing of land records in the Red Corridor to prevent future land-grabbing and exploitation by middlemen.

3. Strategic “Post-Insurgency” Security

• De-mining Operations: Launch a massive, tech-driven joint de-mining exercise (using NSG and CRPF) to clear the thousands of hidden IEDs that pose a long-term threat to civilian life and developmental activity.
• Strengthening Local Police: Gradually withdraw CAPF battalions as the threat recedes, handing over internal security to state police forces (like the DRG or Greyhounds) who have better local intelligence and language skills.

4. Countering “Urban Maoism” & Ideology

• Narrative Building: Use the success stories of surrendered cadres (acting as “Peace Ambassadors”) and events like the Bastar Olympics to build a counter-narrative against the Maoist ideology of violence.
• Financial Intelligence: Continue using the NIA and ED to choke the remnants of the “extortion economy” and urban support networks that provide logistical cover.

5. Economic Diversification

• Sustainable Livelihoods: Promote minor forest produce-based industries, eco-tourism (e.g., in the Bastar circuit), and dairy cooperatives to provide stable income alternatives for the youth.
• Infrastructure Sustainability: Ensure the “3-C Connectivity” (Roads, Mobile, Banks) is maintained and protected from any residual extremist elements.

Conclusion

The March 2026 milestone marks the transition from armed conflict to integrated development. Future success lies in transforming the “Red Corridor” into a vibrant socio-economic zone through tribal empowerment.